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I. Introduction 
This symposium primarily focuses on the extraordinary legal 
and personal saga of one man, Joe Giarratano, his decades-long 
heroic struggle to overturn his death sentence and, ultimately, to 
obtain his release and exoneration. Prior to the conference, my only 
acquaintance with the Giarratano case was the decision in Murray 
v. Giarratano1—the U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the 
Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel does not extend to 
the post-conviction stages of death penalty litigation.2 The 
symposium provided a much broader perspective on the saga of Joe 
Giarratano, whose own legal skills parallel those of the many 
lawyers involved in his representation. My particular panel was 
one focused on mental illness and the death penalty, which, as 
other panelists made evident, was deeply implicated in the 
Giarratano case as well. My participation in the panel, however, 
was intended to offer a broader perspective on the issue, indeed the 
only international law perspective on the array of issues discussed 
during the symposium. This Article addresses the question of what 
international human rights law has to say about the death penalty 
in general, as well as the evolving views of the international 
community as to how mental illness may, or should, bar the 
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty. 
Issues about mental illness and the death penalty remain 
unresolved at the constitutional level in the United States, despite 
a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the topic, as 
will be addressed below.3 It is conservatively estimated that some 
five to ten percent of all inmates on death row suffer from some 
                                                                                                     
 1. 492 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 2. Id. at 12.  
 3. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746 (2015) (upholding the 
particular controversial drug combination used to carry out executions in 
Oklahoma and other states despite the appellant’s Eighth Amendment 
challenge). See generally Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (striking down 
Florida’s rigid calculus of intellectual disability as a bar to execution); Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (holding that a defendant must have a rational 
understanding of the reason for his or her execution); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (prohibiting capital punishment for those under eighteen years of age 
at the time of the offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the 
death penalty for those with intellectual disabilities); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty against the 
legally insane). 
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form of mental illness.4 In a book published in 2014, I predicted 
that the next issue to be addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court—in 
its gradual chipping away at the death penalty in the United 
States—would be whether mental illness, other than insanity, 
should bar the imposition of capital punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution.5 I am not alone in this 
prediction.6 Despite the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and the 
apparent impasse as to the Senate review and confirmation of his 
successor, I continue to believe that the Court will soon take up 
this important question.  
The Court again addressed the contentious issue of lethal 
injection as a method of execution in its 2015 decision Glossip v. 
Gross7—a decision more noteworthy for its dissents than its 
majority opinion. In a far-reaching and exhaustive analysis, 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that “the 
death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a legally 
prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t].’”8 That opinion 
coincides with the arc of justice in the international community 
where the law, standards, and practice bend strongly toward 
abolition.9 This Article will broadly examine the question of how 
international human rights law looks at the death penalty 
generally, as well as the context of those who are mentally ill on 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Position Statement 54: Death Penalty and People with Mental Illness, 
MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/positions/death-penalty (last visited 
Sept. 19, 2016) (noting the California Appellate Project’s estimate regarding the 
mental health of death row inmates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 5. See generally Richard J. Wilson, The Transformative Influence of 
International Law and Practice on the Death Penalty in the United States, in 
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 157, 174–75 (James R. Acker, 
Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed., 2014). 
 6. See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C.L. REV. 
785 (2009) (noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s movement toward barring the 
imposition of the death penalty against those with a mental illness).  
 7. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 8. Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 9. It should be noted that capital punishment is legally permitted in narrow 
circumstances within the international community. See, e.g., International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(noting the limits placed on the death penalty, but not banning it completely). 
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death row.10 The question arises from a consistent approach 
adopted by the European Union and other countries, filing as amici 
curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court, to express the views of the 
international community to that tribunal.11 
This Article unfolds in six Parts. Part II briefly reviews the 
state of the law on the death penalty and mental illness in the 
United States today, largely through the lens of the jurisprudence 
arising under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments rather than a systematic study of practice in 
the states.12 Part III examines the state of the death penalty in 
international human rights law today.13 While the penalty is still 
permitted under various human rights treaties, the strong and 
worldwide trend is toward complete abolition of capital 
punishment.14 Part IV examines some of the methodological 
difficulties in examining the practice of nations and international 
bodies with regard to the death penalty and mental illness,15 while 
Part V summarizes the current views of the world community on 
this important question.16 Finally, Part VI provides brief 
concluding remarks.17 
                                                                                                     
 10. This Article will not address the complex legal question of whether 
mentally ill defendants may be medicated to bring about a forced competency to 
stand trial or to face execution in a drugged condition. There is virtually no data 
on that issue at the international law level.  
 11. I appeared as counsel of record for the European Union and other 
countries as amici curiae in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the death penalty for those with intellectual 
disabilities), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting capital 
punishment for those under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense). In 
each case, the views of the international community were relevant and persuasive 
to the Court’s majorities.  
 12. See infra Part II (discussing case law surrounding competency to be 
executed). 
 13. See infra Part III (discussing the global trend towards the abolition of 
the death penalty). 
 14. Infra Part III. 
 15. See infra Part IV (arguing that, while there may be significant 
methodological difficulties in analyzing the use of the death penalty on a global 
scale, the trend against execution of persons with mental illness is nonetheless 
overwhelming). 
 16. See infra Part V (comparing two contemporaneous international law 
norms regarding execution of persons with mental illnesses). 
 17. See infra Part VI (concluding that international law provides promising 
alternatives through which the United States can more fully and specifically 
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II. A Brief Review of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the 
Death Penalty and Mental Illness 
If a defendant, due to a mental illness, is found incompetent 
to stand trial or insane at the time of the offense, that defendant 
obviously will not be sentenced to death.18 He will be removed from 
the judicial process for treatment and returned for trial only if 
competence is regained.19 If found to be insane at the time of the 
offense, he will be remitted for treatment in custody.20 Cases 
involving the death penalty and mental illness have therefore 
focused primarily on what is commonly referred to as “competence 
to be executed,” and that is the focus of this Article.21  
The classic articulation of a rule—however rustic and 
rudimentary—regarding the death penalty, mental illness, and 
competence for execution came in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 
decision in Ford v. Wainwright,22 which held that “the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of 
                                                                                                     
define the range of severity of mental illness sufficient to bar the death penalty). 
 18. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a 
prisoner who is insane.”). 
 19. In the landmark case of Dusky v. United States, the Supreme Court held, 
in a brief per curium opinion, that for a defendant to be competent to stand trial, 
he must have “a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.” 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). If not 
competent, the defendant is to be hospitalized until he regains competency to 
stand trial. Andrew D. Reisner et al., Competency to Stand Trial and Defendants 
Who Lack Insight into Their Mental Illness, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 85, 
86 (2013) (“The topic of rationality is significant because it bears directly on the 
ability of a defendant to assist legal counsel.”). 
 20. The paradigmatic case is that of John Hinckley Jr., who was acquitted 
by reason of insanity in the shooting of President Ronald Reagan. See generally 
Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinckley, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18tue4.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 
19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The public was 
outraged at the acquittal, but Hinckley remained in custody in a psychiatric ward, 
with limited permission for family visits until recently. Id. Data suggest that the 
defense is rarely invoked, and that defendants who use it are rarely acquitted on 
that ground. Id. 
 21. John H. Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study of 
Competency to be Executed Litigation, 79 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (2013). 
 22. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
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death upon a prisoner who is insane.”23 The majority’s decision, 
written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, was not a beacon of clarity. 
It used the term “insanity” to describe a mental state as execution 
approached; a condition not—in the traditional and narrow legal 
meaning of insanity—limited to a state of mind of the defendant at 
the time of the offense sufficient to excuse the offense.24 Because of 
this lack of clarity and precision, subsequent decisions on this issue 
have tended to rely on the more detailed, if still imprecise, 
concurrence by Justice Powell in Ford, who famously stated that 
“the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who 
are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why 
they are to suffer it.”25  
A 2007 Supreme Court decision on this issue, Panetti v. 
Quarterman,26 provided much heat and little light on the topic of 
competence for execution. There, the majority used due process 
analysis to conclude that Scott Panetti had been denied the 
opportunity to present evidence of his incompetence for 
execution.27 Panetti suffered from delusions that made him believe 
that Texas wanted to execute him, not because he had committed 
murder but because he was preaching the Gospel, according to the 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 409–10.  
 24. See id. at 401–02 (noting that there was no suggestion that Ford was 
incompetent at the time of the offense, but that his behavior gradually changed 
following the offense). 
 25. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). Further efforts to provide greater 
definitional clarity have substituted the term “competence to be executed” for that 
of “insanity” in carrying out the sentence. See Blume, supra note 21, at 1 n.2 (“The 
Court [in Ford v. Wainwright] actually used the term ‘insane’ but it is in fact 
competence that is the issue and post-Ford, it is ubiquitously referred to as 
‘competency to be executed’ as opposed to ‘sanity to be executed.’”). This term, too, 
suffers from a lack of precision, because “competence” is also a term of art 
normally referring to the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and 
assist his counsel so that he can stand trial for an offense. An incompetent 
defendant’s trial can be postponed or avoided entirely if incompetence is 
permanent. I will nonetheless adopt this terminology myself as the dominant 
mode of discourse on the topic.    
 26. 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
 27. See id. at 934–35 (“Under Ford [v. Wainwright], once a prisoner makes 
the requisite preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his 
execution, the Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, entitles him to an adjudication to 
determine his condition.”). 
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trial court’s own appointed experts.28 In order to be competent for 
execution, the Court held that the defendant must have “a rational 
understanding of the reason for the execution.”29 In the absence of 
such an understanding due to his delusions, it was possible that 
Panetti was not aware of the link between his crime and the 
approaching execution. The Court found that “gross delusions 
stemming from a severe mental disorder may put that awareness 
in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can 
serve no proper purpose.”30 The Court reversed and remanded the 
case for further proceedings, which are ongoing as of this writing.31  
In its recent decisions, the closest the Justices have come to 
the issue of mental illness as a bar to execution came in 2014, in 
Hall v. Florida,32 clarifying its 2002 judgment in Atkins v. 
Virginia.33 Atkins struck down the execution of persons with 
intellectual disabilities—then referred to as “retardation”—as 
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.34 In Hall, the 
Court struck down Florida’s rigid calculus of intellectual disability 
as a bar to execution.35 Florida law required imposition of the 
death penalty for anyone scoring above 70 on standard IQ tests.36 
The courts in Florida had interpreted this provision strictly, 
finding that a person who scores higher than 70 is barred from 
submitting further evidence regarding his mental faculties and is 
eligible for the death penalty on grounds of mental state.37 In 
language that seems to apply with equal force to those with mental 
illnesses, the Court found that “intellectual disability is a 
condition, not a number,” and required that Florida consider 
                                                                                                     
 28. Panetti v. Dretke, 448 F.3d 815, 817–18 (5th Cir. 2006).  
 29. Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958. 
 30. Id. at 933. 
 31. Id. at 934. At the time of this writing, the Panetti case is pending review 
on remand in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, under the name 
Panetti v. Stephens. 586 Fed. Appx. 163 (5th Cir. Tex. 2014) (granting a stay of 
execution). Oral argument was heard on September 23, 2015.  
 32. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). 
 33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 34. Id. at 321. 
 35. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2001. 
 36. See id. at 1990 (“If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ 
above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is foreclosed.”). 
 37. See id. at 1992 (“The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall’s appeal and 
held that Florida’s 70-point threshold was constitutional.”). 
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broader evidence of the disability.38 The Court relied heavily on its 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence respecting “the dignity of all 
persons,” looking to “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society” for interpretation of what is cruel 
and unusual.39 This language, which resonates strongly in the 
international law of human rights, looks to broad concepts such as 
deterrence as a justification for capital punishment, and there Hall 
holds that the Florida law falls short.40 People with intellectual 
disabilities are “likely unable to make the calculated judgments 
that are the premise for the deterrence rationale.”41 Such persons 
have “‘diminished ability’ to ‘process information, to learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses,’” 
thus resulting in their inability to control their conduct or conform 
it to the law.42 It is but one small step from this rationale to a 
similar one barring the execution of those suffering from mental 
illnesses.43  
While the U.S. Supreme Court’s articulation of standards has 
not been a model of clarity, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
adopted a detailed resolution on mental illness and the death 
penalty in 2006, which addresses exactly that lacuna.44 The 
resolution articulates an exemption from the death penalty for a 
range of mental disabilities between those encompassed in the 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 2001.  
 39. Id. at 1992.  
 40. Id. at 1993. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 2009 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002)). 
 43. The National Mental Health Association reached this same conclusion 
immediately after the decision in Atkins. See Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of the 
Task Force Proposal on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.L. 
REV. 1123, 1123 (2005) (“Within hours after the decision in Atkins was announced, 
the National Mental Health Association stated that the same principles and 
reasoning that Atkins applied to the mentally retarded were equally applicable to 
many with mental illness, who the Association said should also be categorically 
exempted from capital punishment.”).  
 44. See generally Symposium, Recommendations of the American Bar 
Association Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities Task Force on 
Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 1115, 1115–16 (2005) 
[hereinafter Recommendations]. The recommendations were subsequently 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates as Recommendation 122A. See generally 
AM. BAR ASS’N, MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION (2006), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Rep
resentation/2006_am_122a.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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vague “insanity” standard and the bar on execution of those with 
intellectual disabilities, under the robust Hall standard.45 The 
drafters concluded that an exemption from the death penalty also 
should apply to those persons whose mental disorders are 
“functionally the same as mental retardation,” such as very serious 
head injuries, or to persons with “such serious mental illness that 
their culpability is as diminished as those with mental 
retardation.”46 “This lesser extent of culpability arises from such 
effects of their mental illnesses as delusions, hallucinations, 
significant thought disorders, and highly disorganized thinking.”47 
It would apply to those with “such disorders as schizophrenia and 
psychosis.”48 This typology is helpful in distinguishing the various 
categories of mental illness and their legal consequences in the 
context of capital punishment.  
III. The Death Penalty in International Human Rights Law and 
Practice: Toward Abolition 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, discussed 
above, asserted that more than two-thirds of the world’s nations 
(he counted 137 of the 193 countries of the world) have abolished 
the death penalty as of the end of 2014.49 While this data is 
impressive, more recent statistics suggest an even more aggressive 
pattern of abolition.50 In August 2014, Ban Ki-moon, the U.N. 
Secretary General, documented “approximately 160 of the 193 
Member States” of the United Nations as having abolished the 
death penalty or having adopted a moratorium on its use in any 
                                                                                                     
 45. See generally Recommendations, supra note 44; see also Hall v. Florida, 
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014) (discussing Florida courts’ use of IQ scores to 
determine eligibility for the death penalty). 
 46. Tabak, supra note 43, at 1127–28.  
 47. Id. at 1128. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2775 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I 
note, however, that many nations—indeed, 95 of the 193 members of the United 
Nations—have formally abolished the death penalty and an additional 42 have 
abolished it in practice.”). 
 50. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 67/176, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, 
at ¶ 8 (Dec. 20, 2012) (noting the growing number of countries moving away from 
the death penalty). 
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circumstance.51 That is more than eighty percent of the world’s 
nations.52 The worldwide trend is moving rapidly toward 
abolition.53 
In December 2014, the U.N. General Assembly passed its fifth 
resolution—the first of which was adopted in 2007—calling for all 
retentionist countries to adopt a moratorium on the death penalty, 
and for those countries that continue to apply it, not to impose a 
sentence of death “on persons with mental or intellectual 
disabilities.”54 Within the United Nations, opposition to the death 
penalty is widespread, with growing agitation for abolition from 
several fronts.55 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has convened high-level panels on the question of the death 
penalty between 2012 and 2015.56 The last of these panels, in July 
2015, formally emphasized “the international community’s 
responsibility to move towards universal abolition of the death 
penalty.”57 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
                                                                                                     
 51. U.N. Secretary-General, Moratorium on the Use of the Death Penalty, 
¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/69/288 (Aug. 8, 2014). While no sources are offered for that 
statistic in his report, a report from an international watchdog group on the death 
penalty supports the tally. See Country Status on the Death Penalty, HANDS OFF 
CAIN, http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/index.php?tipotema=arg&idtema= 
20000702 (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (documenting 161 countries as abolitionist 
in law or practice, with thirty-seven retentionist countries) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. Country Status on the Death Penalty, supra note 51. 
 53. See id. (noting the growing number of countries moving away from the 
death penalty); G.A. Res. 67/176, supra note 50, at ¶ 8 (same). 
 54. G.A. Res. 69/186, ¶ 5(d) (Feb. 4, 2015). The vote was 117 in favor of the 
resolution, 38 against (including the United States), and 34 abstentions.  
AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS: 2014 (2015), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathSentencesAndExecutions2014_EN.pdf. 
 55. See generally U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GLOB. PANEL, 
MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY: ARGUMENTS, TRENDS, AND PERSPECTIVES 
(2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Lists/MeetingsNY/Attachments/52/ Moving-Away-
from-the-Death-Penalty.pdf [hereinafter Arguments, Trends, and Perspectives] 
(discussing the growing opposition to the death penalty throughout the 
international community); U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS GLOB. PANEL, 
MOVING AWAY FROM THE DEATH PENALTY: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
(2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Lists/MeetingsNY/Attachments/27/ 
moving_away_from_death_penalty_web.pdf [hereinafter Lessons from National 
Experience] (same). 
 56. See generally Arguments, Trends, and Perspectives, supra note 55; 
Lessons from National Experience, supra note 55.  
 57. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, High-Level Panel 
Discussion on the Question of the Death Penalty, at ¶ 45, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/21 
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Summary or Arbitrary Executions58 and the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment59 
support a moratorium or abolition of the death penalty, 
respectively.60 The Special Rapporteur on Torture explicitly 
extends his recommendation on abolition to those “persons with 
mental disabilities.”61 Finally, in his 2012 report to the U.N. 
General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions notes that, in addition to calls 
from the General Assembly, a moratorium on the death penalty 
has been issued by “the Council of Europe, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and, in August 2012, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.”62 Globally and 
regionally, calls for moratoria and abolition are on the rise.  
The twenty-eight countries of the European Union have a 
combined population of over 503 million persons, making it the 
third largest world population after China and India.63 The death 
penalty has been abolished for all purposes within the Union.64 All 
E.U. Member States are also members of the larger Council of 
Europe, with a total of forty-seven countries65 and a combined 
                                                                                                     
(July 16, 2015). 
 58. See U.N. Secretary-General, Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, ¶ 118, U.N. Doc. A/67/275 (Aug. 9, 2012) (calling for a moratorium in 
retentionist states).  
 59. See U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, ¶ 74–75, U.N. Doc. 
A/67/269 (Aug. 9, 2012) (finding that the prohibition on torture may bar the death 
penalty as a developing norm of customary international law).  
 60. Id.; Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 58. 
 61. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, supra note 59, at ¶ 80(a). 
 62. Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 58, at ¶ 22.  
 63. Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-
figures/living/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2016) (last visited Sept. 19, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 64. Background: The Death Penalty and the EU’s Policy on Its Abolition, 
EUROPEAN UNION, https://eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/adp/docs/death_penalty_ 
background_en.pdf. 
 65. EU Member Countries, EU, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries/member-countries_en (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Member countries include: Albania, Andorra, 
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
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population of some 820 million persons.66 Membership in the 
Council of Europe, in turn, is conditioned on the abolition of, or a 
moratorium on, the death penalty, including Protocols 6 and 13 to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), which together abolish the 
death penalty in all circumstances.67  
The European Court of Human Rights applies the ECHR.68 In 
2010, the court decided a case involving two Iraqi nationals held in 
British custody who faced the death penalty if turned over to the 
national courts of Iraq.69 The court took as its starting point the 
following formulation regarding the death penalty: 
Judicial execution involves the deliberate and premeditated 
destruction of a human being by the State authorities. 
Whatever the method of execution, the extinction of life involves 
some physical pain. In addition, the foreknowledge of death at 
the hands of the State must inevitably give rise to intense 
psychological suffering. The fact that the imposition and use of 
the death penalty negates fundamental human rights has been 
recognised by the member States of the Council of Europe.70 
The court went on to find that the applicants’ “well-founded fear” 
of being executed by Iraqi courts “must have given rise to a 
significant degree of mental suffering,” thus violating Article 3 of 
the ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading 
                                                                                                     
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San 
Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United 
Kingdom. Id. 
 66. Living in the EU, supra note 63. 
 67. EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 38, 52 (2010) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Convention_ENG.pdf. All countries save Russia have ratified Protocol 6, and 
Russia has adopted a de facto moratorium since 1999. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 
54, at 65 n.173. The same is true for Protocol 13, which also has not been ratified 
by Armenia and Azerbaijan, but where a moratorium is in effect in both countries. 
Id. at 67.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, Eur. Ct. 
H.R., ¶ 120 (Apr. 10, 2010). 
 70. Id. at ¶ 120. 
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treatment or punishment.71 The individuals in question could not 
be surrendered to face a sentence of death without violation of the 
ECHR.72 That ECHR standard is similar to the prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishments in the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment.73 Moreover, the European Court has recognized and 
approved the practice of requiring that the United States and other 
retentionist countries provide diplomatic assurances against the 
death penalty prior to allowing the extradition of a Council of 
Europe national to that country, thus further limiting the death 
penalty in the United States.74 
This widespread movement of the world community toward 
abolition of the death penalty suggests that the United States 
should follow that trend, if not through legislation, then through 
brave and courageous positions such as those expressed by Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg in their joint Glossip dissent.75 The death 
penalty itself is cruel and unusual, as the Eighth Amendment is 
understood in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
IV. Some Methodological Challenges in Documentation of Mental 
Illness and Death Penalty Issues in International Law 
There are three basic challenges to the documentation of 
issues regarding the more limited issue of imposition of the death 
penalty for those with mental illness. First, the death penalty itself 
is severely limited, but still permitted, under international 
treaties, global and regional. While detailed constraints on the 
penalty are articulated in the treaties, none of them explicitly 
creates an exception for the execution of persons with mental 
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at ¶ 137. 
 72. See EU Policy on Death Penalty, supra note 64 (stating that cruel and 
inhumane treatment violates the ECHR). 
 73. Compare EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, supra note 67, with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 74. See, e.g., Rrapo v. Albania, App. No. 58555/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 73 (Sept. 
25, 2012) (finding that diplomatic assurances from the United States to the 
Albanian government, barring the application of the death penalty, were 
adequate to permit extradition of the applicant to the United States). 
 75. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
(concluding that “the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a 
legally prohibited ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t]’”). 
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illness. Second, terms of reference differ widely, and cultural and 
legal practice varies extremely widely among countries. Third, 
information on the death penalty and mental illness is not easily 
available from national reports to U.N. treaty bodies, as is often 
the case with other data on human rights compliance. I will discuss 
each of these issues in turn, then argue in Part IV that the trend 
against execution of persons with mental illness is nonetheless 
overwhelming.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), a global human rights treaty to which the United States 
is a party,76 is typical of the treaties limiting the death penalty. It 
includes a provision, in Article 6, regarding the right to life.77 
Within the treaty, that right is qualified as to the application of the 
death penalty.78 The relevant language reads as follows: 
Article 6 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life.  
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, 
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious 
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime. . . . This penalty can only be carried 
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court. 
. . . .  
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek 
pardon or commutation of the sentence.  
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may 
be granted in all cases. 
 5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed 
by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried 
out on pregnant women. 
                                                                                                     
 76. For reports regarding United States compliance with its human rights 
treaty obligations, see U.S. Treaty Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/reports/treaties/index.htm#ftn2 (last visited Sept. 19, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, supra note 9. 
 78. Id.  
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 6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent 
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the 
present Covenant.79 
The Human Rights Committee—which oversees compliance 
with the ICCPR—issues General Comments regarding treaty 
interpretation based on its experience with the treaty. The 
Committee has commented on the death penalty language in the 
treaty on only one occasion, in its General Comment 6, issued in 
1982.80 There, it states that Article 6 “refers generally to abolition 
in terms which strongly suggest . . . that abolition is desirable.”81 
The Committee also states that “the expression ‘most serious 
crimes’ must be read restrictively to mean that the death penalty 
should be a quite exceptional measure.”82 The treaty itself 
articulates only two groups for whom execution is explicitly barred: 
persons below eighteen years of age and pregnant women.83 That 
explicit exception came into play, for example, in the case of Roper 
v. Simmons,84 which struck down the death penalty for those 
minors under eighteen at the time of their offenses.85 No language 
appears on the face of this treaty or any other international human 
rights treaty that explicitly addresses or prohibits the execution of 
persons with intellectual or mental disabilities. Other sources have 
to suffice. As the next Part shows, they are ample. 
The second limiting issue is that of consistency of terminology 
and cultural or legal limitations on proper medical diagnosis 
around the world. Examples that appear in the reported cases use 
a staggering variety of terms for mental illness itself, and hardly 
ever with medical precision: “madness,” “impairment of mind” or 
“cognitive impairment,” “disorder,” “handicap,” “abnormality,” and 
“disability” provide just a few examples.86 Often, issues of limited 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment 
6 (1982), at ¶¶ 6, 7. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, supra note 9. 
 84. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 85. Id. at 568 (“A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the 
Eighth Amendment.”). 
 86. See, e.g., id. at 573 (“disorder”); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 
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intellectual capacity (associated with lower IQ scores) are 
conflated with those of mental illness in reports or judicial 
decisions.87 Achieving an accurate medical and psychiatric 
assessment of the accused or convicted capital defendant, whether 
on trial or in prison, is often difficult in many countries.88 The U.N. 
Secretary General himself noted this in his 2009 periodic report to 
the General Assembly regarding capital punishment.89 There, he 
reviewed the standards for imposition of the death penalty, noting 
that what was then called the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
had called for U.N. member states “not to impose capital 
punishment on or to execute ‘a person suffering from any mental 
or intellectual disabilities.’”90 His seemingly frustrated response 
states: 
Whereas with juvenile offenders or pregnant women, the 
determination that a person belongs to the protected category 
is relatively straightforward, there is an enormous degree of 
subjectivity involved when assessing such concepts as insanity, 
limited mental competence and “any form of mental disorder.” 
The expression “any form of mental disorder” probably applies 
to a large number of people sentenced to death.91 
Finally, there are simple issues regarding lack of accurate 
reporting on state practice. In its widespread reforms of 2007, the 
United Nations redesigned a number of processes regarding 
human rights reporting.92 The Human Rights Commission was 
abolished and replaced by a new Human Rights Council and the 
new Council was charged with administration of a process called 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR), which requires that all member 
states of the United Nations submit a periodic report regarding 
their compliance with human rights norms, regardless of the 
                                                                                                     
(2014) (“disability”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986) (“madness”). 
 87. See, e.g., Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 (discussing Florida courts’ use of IQ 
scores to determine eligibility for the death penalty).  
 88. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and 
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those 
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 93, U.N. Doc. E/2010/10 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at ¶ 90. 
 91. Id. at ¶ 93.  
 92. See generally G.A. Res. 5/1 (June 18, 2007). 
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formal instruments adopted by that nation.93 In his first report 
after the adoption of the UPR process, the U.N. Secretary General 
again expressed his frustration to the General Assembly in his 
ninth quinquennial report on the death penalty of 2015.94 He 
concluded: “There is virtually no information on [execution of 
persons with mental disabilities] in the replies to the 
questionnaires, in the materials generated by the universal 
periodic review process or in the work of the treaty bodies.”95 While 
the conclusions of the Secretary General parallel those of the 
author’s own research on U.N. treaty and universal periodic review 
reports, the body of jurisprudence on this issue—as the next Part 
documents—is robust and conclusive. The death penalty is 
inappropriate for those suffering from mental illness. The question 
is one of the degree and specificity of the illness to justify the bar.  
V. The Evolving Jurisprudence on the Death Penalty and Mental 
Illness Under International Human Rights Law 
The bar on execution of the insane long predates the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ford v. Wainwright.96 In the late 
eighteenth century, Sir Edward Coke, the great English jurist, said 
that “by intendment of law the execution of the offender is for 
example . . . but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but 
should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme 
inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others.”97 Coke 
spoke of those prisoners who were found not to be legally insane at 
the time of trial, but became “mad” as execution approached.98 The 
passage from Coke’s Institutes is repeated in Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Ford, which notes, from the very outset, its debt to the 
history of the common law on execution of the “insane:” “For 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at § I. 
 94. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and 
Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those 
Facing the Death Penalty, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. E/2015/49 (July 21–22, 2015). 
 95. Id. 
 96. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 6 (1797). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
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centuries no jurisdiction has countenanced the execution of the 
insane, yet this Court has never decided whether the Constitution 
forbids the practice. Today we keep faith with our common-law 
heritage in holding that it does.”99 
As early as 1962, scholars in the United States had concluded 
that under the common law and, “as far as we know, the law of all 
civilized nations, a person who is insane cannot be punished.”100 
Later in the same article, the authors made their finding more 
precise: “for practical purposes we can think of the rule [on 
insanity] in its common law form as an exemption from capital 
punishment.”101 While these scholars provided no data to support 
their conclusion, later scholars have reached the same conclusion 
through careful analysis of international law and practice.102 Some 
empirical support for that conclusion is found in the first report of 
the United Nations on the death penalty, conducted in the early 
1960s.103 That study, which surveyed all U.N. member countries, 
noted:  
Under the law of some countries, a person may not be executed 
if he is insane, whether at the time of the sentence or at the time 
when it is to be carried out; this is the case, for example, in the 
Central African Republic, China, Iraq, Greece and 
Yugoslavia.104  
There was enough conclusive evidence of the widespread bar by 
2002 that Professor William Schabas, in his definitive book on 
abolition of the death penalty in international law, concluded that 
it is “a norm of customary law that the insane may not be 
executed.”105 
The recently adopted UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (“CRPD”)—signed but not ratified by the United 
States—does not address the precise question of the use of capital 
                                                                                                     
 99. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 100. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the 
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 381 (1962).   
 101. Id. at 382.  
 102. See, e.g., Marc Ancel, Capital Punishment, ¶ 71, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SD/9 
(1962). 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (3d ed. 2002). 
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punishment on persons with mental illness; it does, however, 
provide some definitional guidance that can be helpful here.106 The 
CRPD includes, in the category of persons with disabilities, “those 
who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others.”107 Similarly, the regional treaty of the Americas 
on persons with disabilities defines “disability” as “a physical, 
mental, or sensory impairment, whether permanent or temporary, 
that limits the capacity to perform one or more essential activities 
of daily life, and which can be caused or aggravated by the 
economic and social environment.”108 Notably, in neither treaty is 
a distinction made between mental illness and intellectual 
disability, and the term “mental illness” is not used; “mental 
impairment” is the chosen referent.109 
Another baseline of international law for the treatment of 
mentally ill prisoners in general can be found in the United 
Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners.110 These baseline rules were adopted sixty years ago by 
the First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Prisoners, held in 1995, and were subsequently 
approved by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (“ECOSOC”) in 
1957 and again, with revisions, in 1977.111 Of particular relevance 
is Standard 22(1), which recommends that every prison “include a 
                                                                                                     
 106. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 
1, Mar. 30, 2007, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities art. 1, June 8, 1999, AG/RES. 
1608 (XXIX-O/99). The treaty entered into force on September 14, 2001, and has 
nineteen states parties at present. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, OAS, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-65.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The United States has not signed 
the treaty. Id.  
 109. See Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, supra note 108, art. 1 (noting 
the use of the term “mental impairment” throughout the treaty); Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 106, at 3 (same). 
 110. See generally Economic and Social Council Res. 663 C (XXIV) (July 31, 
1957), Res. 2076 (LXII) (May 13, 1977). 
 111. Id. 
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psychiatric service for the diagnosis and, in proper cases, the 
treatment of states of mental abnormality.”112 Standards 24 and 
25 govern the examination, treatment and rehabilitation of 
mentally impaired individuals.113 Standard 24 mandates 
examination by a medical officer “as soon as possible after his 
admission and thereafter as necessary,” and documentation of 
“mental defects which might hamper rehabilitation.”114 Finally, 
Standard 25 sets out rigorous standards requiring that the medical 
officer report to the prison director when a prisoner’s mental 
health “has been or will be injuriously affected by continued 
imprisonment or by any condition of imprisonment.”115 The 
director is admonished to “take immediate steps to give effect to 
those recommendations,” or to seek assistance from higher 
authorities to do so.116 The Standard Minimum Rules, as now 
written, do not address the question of the execution of the insane 
or mentally impaired individual.117 
The question remains, therefore, as to what international 
human rights law has to say about the prisoner awaiting execution 
who is not legally insane, but who suffers from some form of mental 
illness or impairment. Two distinct lines of authority have 
developed, one which argues that any mental illness should 
exempt the defendant from execution,118 while another argues that 
only certain serious or severe mental illnesses should bar the death 
penalty.119 I will address each of these lines of authority separately 
in the following subsections. 
                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 22(1). 
 113. Id. at 24, 25. 
 114. Id. at 24. 
 115. Id. at 25. 
 116. Id. at 26(2). 
 117. See G.A. Res. 70/175 (Dec. 17, 2015) (noting that the new U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules have been renamed as the Nelson Mandela Rules). 
 118. Supra Part V.A. 
 119. Supra Part V.B. 
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A. Support for a Ban on Execution of Persons with Any Mental 
Impairment 
This line of authority appears to have emerged from the strong 
advocacy of the European Union within the United Nations and its 
influence on the development of international policies within the 
United Nations and other bodies.120 The E.U. policy on the death 
penalty and mental illness is set out fully in the E.U. Council’s 
guidelines on the death penalty.121 There, the Council sets out 
minimum standards for those countries that retain the death 
penalty, in Section III.122 Subsection (iv) in that section states that 
capital punishment “shall not be imposed on . . . persons suffering 
from any mental illness or having an intellectual disability.”123 The 
term “mental illness” is not defined in the guidelines, although it 
is distinguished from intellectual disabilities, so more general 
definitions such as those discussed above must be applied.  
Beginning in 2000, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
then the principal deliberative body of the United Nations on 
human rights issues, adopted annual resolutions specifically 
addressing the question of the execution of those with mental 
illness.124 The resolutions consistently call on states “[n]ot to 
impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of 
mental disorder or to execute any such person.”125 Similar 
resolutions containing identical language were passed each year 
until the year before the Commission was abolished and replaced 
by the newly reformed U.N. Human Rights Council in 2006.126 
There is no evidence that the resolutions of the Commission were 
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, at least as to the “any 
                                                                                                     
 120. See generally Council Common Guidelines on Death Penalty (EU) No. 
8416/13 Annex of 12 Apr. 2013, at 5, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document 
/ST-8416-2013-INIT/en/pdf (stating the European Union’s policy on the death 
penalty). 
 121. Id.  
 122. See id. § 3 (“While continuing to state its strong opposition to the death 
penalty and advocate for its full abolition, the EU shall insist that those countries 
that still maintain executions respect the following minimum standards . . . .). 
 123. Id. § 3(iv) (emphasis added). 
 124. C.H.R. Res. 2000/65 (Apr. 26, 2000). The United States voted against the 
resolution each year.  
 125. Id. § 3(e).  
 126. Each resolution contained virtually identical language. Id. 
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form” language. However, it should be noted that the United 
Nations’ resolutions on the death penalty, adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly from 2007—the year after the last Commission 
resolution—through 2015, use generic language admonishing 
retentionist countries not to impose a sentence of death “on persons 
with mental or intellectual disabilities.”127 The gravity or severity 
of the mental disability is not specified and can therefore be read 
to be general and inclusive of any such disability, if the resolutions 
are to be read consistently with prior action within U.N. bodies. 
Support for the “any mental illness” position is also found in 
two important death penalty decisions affecting multiple 
individuals, one from the Commission on Human Rights and the 
other from the Supreme Court of India. Each applies the “any 
mental illness” standard as a limitation on execution of the 
mentally ill death row inmate.128 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR” 
or “Commission”) is a principal and autonomous human rights 
body representing the thirty-five countries making up the 
Organization of American States, including the United States.129 
During its long tenure, but particularly in the last twenty years, it 
has expressed growing concerns about the death penalty in the 
hemisphere.130 In 2011, the Commission produced a significant 
report calling for a moratorium on the death penalty “as a step 
toward the gradual disappearance of this penalty.”131 Moreover, in 
connection with its adoption of the regional convention on 
disability rights, discussed above, the IACHR adopted a specific 
recommendation calling on member states of the Organization of 
American States to establish laws that “guarantee respect for the 
                                                                                                     
 127. G.A. Res. 69/186 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 128. See infra pp. 1489–93 (providing the “any mental illness” position used 
by the IACHR and the Supreme Court of India).  
 129. See generally What Is the IACHR?, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/ 
mandate/what.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 130. See, e.g., 25 Years After the Adoption of the Protocol, the IACHR Urges 
States to Abolish the Death Penalty or Take Steps Toward its Abolition, OAS (June 
8, 2015), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2015/062. asp (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2016) (noting the organization’s efforts to abolish the death 
penalty) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 131. Inter-Am. C.H.R., The Death Penalty in the Inter-American System: From 
Restrictions to Abolition, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 68 rev. ¶ 143 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
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fundamental freedoms and human rights of persons with mental 
disability . . . incorporating international standards and the 
provisions of human rights conventions that protect the mentally 
ill.”132  
One of the most significant international cases on capital 
punishment in recent years comes from the IACHR and involves 
the application of the death penalty in the United States. In 2013, 
the Commission decided the case of Lackey v. United States.133 In 
Lackey, the Commission took the unusual step of consolidating the 
cases of sixteen separate defendants in death penalty cases who 
had petitioned the system, arising from convictions in six different 
states: North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Missouri, Texas, 
and Utah.134 By the time the Commission decided the case, six 
individuals had been executed, despite a request by the 
Commission that the U.S. government take precautionary 
measures to assure that executions not be carried out while the 
cases were pending at the IACHR.135 The Commission focused its 
attention on a group of five claims common to all of the cases, one 
of which is relevant to the discussion here: mental illness as a bar 
to execution.136 The Commission found that five of the petitioning 
inmates suffered from mental disorders of varying degrees of 
severity.137  
                                                                                                     
 132. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Recommendation of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Mentally 
Ill, OAS/Ser L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. ¶ 3 (Apr. 4, 2011). 
 133. See generally Cases 11.575, 12.333 & 12.341, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 52/13 (2013). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at ¶ 1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Two of the inmates, David Leisure and James Wilson Chambers, were 
found to have mental disabilities associated with low IQ, and are not discussed 
here, although the violations recognized by the Commission applied equally to 
them. Id. The five inmates with mental disorders, and the state in which they 
were convicted, were James Brown of Georgia (paranoid schizophrenia, acute 
psychosis with visual and audio hallucinations); Id. at ¶ 28; Robert Karl Hicks of 
Georgia (microcephaly with frontal lobe dysfunction); Id. at ¶ 39; Troy Albert 
Kunkle of Texas (schizophrenia and serious childhood abuse); Id. at ¶ 45; Jaime 
Elizalde Jr. of Texas (unspecified mental disorder not raised timely by defense 
counsel); Id. at ¶ 59; and Angel Maturino Resendiz of Texas (schizophrenia, 
hallucinations and self-mutilation). Id. at ¶ 63. 
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At the beginning of the discussion on mental disorders and the 
death penalty, the Commission stated the following:  
It is a principle of international law that persons with mental 
disabilities, either at the time of the commission of the crime or 
during trial, cannot be sentenced to the death penalty. 
Likewise, international law also prohibits execution of a person 
sentenced to death if that person has a mental disability at the 
time of execution.138 
The Commission then cites, with approval, the recommendation of 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, referred to above, which, 
it notes, “called upon all States that still have the death penalty 
‘[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any 
mental or intellectual disabilities or to execute any such 
person.’”139 The IACHR found violations of the right to life and to 
protection against “cruel, infamous or unusual punishment,” 
language that comes from the American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man, to which the Commission has repeatedly found 
that the United States is bound.140 Their conclusion on the issue 
reads as follows:  
As the right to life is the ultimate right, and given the 
heightened degree of scrutiny required in capital cases, the 
Inter-American Commission considers that persons with mental 
disability cannot be subjected to capital punishment, as these 
individuals are unable to comprehend the reason for or 
consequence of their execution.141 
The Commission does not qualify “mental disability” in any way, 
although the facts in the cases before it suggest certain gravity in 
the illnesses of the designated death row inmates.142  
Other cases involving the death penalty and mental illness are 
in the process of resolution and reflect the serious attention to be 
given by the Commission to the issue of mental illness and the 
death penalty. They include an admissibility decision—a decision 
to hear the merits of a petition—from a death row inmate in 
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 139. Id. at ¶ 214.  
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 141. Id. at ¶ 218 (emphasis added). 
 142. See id. (listing various mental illnesses involved in cases before the 
Commission). 
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Tennessee who exhibits severe mental illness,143 and the issuance 
of two requests in 2014 for precautionary measures to the U.S. 
government to prevent executions while the cases are pending 
before the Commission. The first case arises in Ohio, where the 
condemned defendant exhibits significant brain damage and other 
mental illness,144 and the other in Arizona, where the defendant 
alleges “crippling mental illness” and traumatic brain injury.145 
Similar to the Commission, the Indian Supreme Court dealt 
with a consolidated case involving twelve petitioners convicted of 
capital crimes, all of whom had extended stays on death row.146 
There, the unanimous court commuted the death sentences of two 
men treated for “chronic psychotic illnesses.”147 In support of its 
legal conclusion, the court relied primarily on the standard 
articulated in the 2005 resolution of the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights, which, as the previous resolutions had, called on 
“all States that still maintain the death penalty . . . not to impose 
the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental 
disorder or to execute any such person.”148  
Here, then, we have U.N. bodies repeatedly adopting the “any 
mental illness” formulation of the European Union over a number 
of years, as well as the IACHR and the highest court of India. 
Support for that formulation is extensive. 
                                                                                                     
 143. See Thompson v. United States, Case 194-04, Report No. 132/11, at 2, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2011) (noting that Mr. Thompson was allegedly “diagnosed 
with bipolar affective disorder, schizo-affective disorder, and schizophrenia”).  
 144. See generally Moreland v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Resolution No. 32/2014, Precautionary Measure No. 37-14 (2014). 
 145. Rogovich v. United States, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Resolution No. 
4/2014, Precautionary Measure No. 57-14 (Mar. 4, 2014). 
 146. Shatrughan Chauan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 (India).  
 147. Id. at ¶ 71. 
 148. Id. at ¶ 73. The court concluded that “[i]n view of the well-established 
laws both at national as well as international sphere, we are inclined to consider 
insanity as one of the supervening circumstances that warrants for commutation 
of death sentence to life imprisonment.” Id. at ¶ 79. 
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B. Support for a Ban on Execution of Persons with Severe Mental 
Impairment 
The primary articulation of a standard regarding the 
limitation on execution of persons with severe or serious mental 
illness is found in the American Bar Association’s 2006 
recommendation, discussed above.149 Some U.N. standards and 
recommendations articulate a measure of gravity of the mental 
illness when calling on countries to end the practice of the death 
penalty for those with mental illness. Those sources are examined 
below. 
In the 1980s, the U.N. Economic and Social Council adopted 
safeguards concerning the application of the death penalty.150 The 
earliest version of the Safeguards called for prohibition of the 
execution of “persons who have become insane,” thus contributing 
to the worldwide consensus on execution of the insane discussed 
earlier in this article.151 The Safeguards were endorsed by the U.N. 
General Assembly in the same year.152 In 1988, the Safeguards 
were updated and made more specific, admonishing states where 
the death penalty was not in force to eliminate the death penalty 
“for persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely 
limited mental competence, whether at the stage of sentence or 
execution.”153 The resolution was adopted without a vote.154 It 
articulates a relatively high bar of “extremely limited” competence, 
which I read to mean a severe level of mental illness.155 
The language regarding the execution stage in both versions 
of the Safeguards makes clear that the United Nations was 
attempting to deal with ongoing mental illness and not sanity at 
the time of the offense, or competency at the time of trial. This is 
                                                                                                     
 149. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 44. 
 150. See Economic and Social Council Res. 1984/50, Safeguards Guaranteeing 
Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty (1984) (providing the 
first iteration). 
 151. Id. at ¶ 3. See generally supra Part III. 
 152. See G.A. Res. 39/118, ¶ 2, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice 
(1984) (endorsing “the recommendations contained in Economic and Social 
Council resolutions 1984/47 and 1984/50 on procedures . . . and safeguards 
guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty”). 
 153. Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/64, ¶ 1(d) (1989). 
 154. SCHABAS, supra note 105, at 173 n.155. 
 155. Economic and Social Council Res. 1989/64, ¶ 1(d) (1989). 
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borne out by the 2010 report of the U.N. Secretary General, who 
concluded that:  
The norm protecting insane and mentally disabled persons from 
execution applies even when there is no question of competency 
at the time the crime was committed or at trial. It is not 
uncommon for a person to become insane subsequent to 
conviction and sentence of death, and in such cases execution is 
forbidden by the third safeguard.156  
The Safeguards have been widely endorsed by other U.N. 
bodies in subsequent reporting. For example, in his 2000 report to 
the General Assembly, the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions commented in 
detail as follows:  
The Special Rapporteur wishes to stress that in resolution 
1989/64 the Economic and Social Council also recommended 
that States strengthen the protection of the rights of those 
facing the death penalty by eliminating the death penalty for 
persons suffering from mental handicap or extremely limited 
mental capacity. Moreover, the Safeguards guaranteeing 
protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty 
stipulate that the death penalty shall not be carried out on 
persons who have become insane. The Special Rapporteur 
strongly supports these recommendations and urges States to 
take action to reflect these restrictions in domestic law.157 
In its concluding observations to the report of the United 
States under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, submitted in 2006, the Human Rights Committee 
welcomed the decision by the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 
and encouraged the United States “to ensure that persons 
suffering from severe forms of mental illness not amounting to 
mental retardation are equally protected.”158 Here, the Committee 
                                                                                                     
 156. U.N. Secretary-General, Capital Punishment and the Implementation of 
the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death 
Penalty, ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. E/2010/10 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
 157. Comm’n on H.R., Econ. & Soc. Council, Civil and Political Rights, 
Including Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, ¶ 69, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/2 (Jan. 25, 2000) (emphasis added). 
 158. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: 
United States of America, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 
2006) (emphasis added).  
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adopts language similar to that of the ABA recommendation on 
mental illness and the death penalty.159  
International human rights bodies, as well as national courts, 
have addressed the question of mental illness of death row 
prisoners. Their results uniformly require or call for elimination of 
the death sentence and recognition of the need for treatment of the 
affected prisoner. Examples come primarily from the deliberations 
of the Human Rights Committee, which oversees individual 
complaints under the First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and state practice in the 
Caribbean and Japan. 
In 1994, the Human Rights Committee decided Francis v. 
Jamaica,160 one of the first international cases to raise the issue of 
mental illness and capital punishment. Over the course of more 
than a decade on death row, many years of which were spent in 
solitary confinement, Mr. Francis’ defense counsel and a prison 
chaplain noticed deterioration in his mental state.161 He was 
reported to have “a high level of cognitive impairment” as well as 
“general mental disturbance and paranoia.”162 While the 
government was said to have examined the prisoner, no results 
were made public or shared with the Committee.163 Petitioner’s 
counsel cited to both the 1984 and 1989 versions of the ECOSOC 
Resolutions cited here.164 The Committee found that the 
petitioner’s “mental health seriously deteriorated during 
incarceration on death row.”165 It found violations of the 
prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (Art. 7), 
and the requirement of humane treatment when deprived of 
liberty (Art. 10.1),166 and requested the government to provide 
                                                                                                     
 159. See Recommendations, supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining 
the standard used by the ABA). 
 160. Francis v. Jamaica, H.R. Comm. No. 606/1994, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/54/D/606/1994 (1995). 
 161. Id. at ¶ 3.7. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at ¶ 3.7, 3.8, 4.5. 
 164. Id. at ¶ 4.6. 
 165. Id. at ¶ 9.2.  
 166. Id. at ¶ 9.2.  
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appropriate treatment of the illness and consideration for early 
release.167 
A similar result occurred in another Jamaican case two years 
later, Williams v. Jamaica.168 There, however, mental instability 
began as early as trial.169 The defendant’s “mental condition 
seriously deteriorated” during his confinement on death row, and 
the government failed to carry out its commitment to conduct a 
mental examination in prison.170 Defense experts found that Mr. 
Williams exhibited auditory hallucinations and paranoid 
schizophrenia.171 The Committee recommended an appropriate 
remedy, particularly medical treatment.172  
Finally, in 2002, the Committee heard another case from the 
Caribbean and found similar violations. In R.S. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago,173 defense counsel submitted an affidavit based on his 
visits with his death-sentenced client, a psychiatrist’s visit, and 
indications from a prison guard, that his client was “experiencing 
auditory hallucinations and [was] probably suffering from severe 
mental illness.”174 In its conclusions, the Committee noted that 
“the author’s mental state at the time of the reading of the death 
warrant was obvious to those around him and should have been 
apparent to the prison authorities.”175 That is, his mental illness 
was serious. The Committee took particular note of the fact that 
the claim was one having to do with competence for execution and 
not mental illness at the time of the offense or trial, and found that 
issuance of a warrant for execution in such circumstances would 
violate the prohibition on cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment 
or punishment and called for his treatment or release.176 
                                                                                                     
 167. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 168. Williams v. Jamaica, H.R. Comm. No. 609/1995, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 (1997). 
 169. See id. at ¶ 2.3 (“Counsel indicates that at the time of the trial in 
December 1988, the author already displayed signs of mental disturbance.”). 
 170. Id. at ¶ 6.5.  
 171. Id. at ¶ 2.4. 
 172. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 173. R.S. v. Trinidad & Tobago, H.R. Comm. No. 684/1996, U.N. Doc. 684/1996 
(2002). 
 174. Id. at ¶ 2.3–2.6 (emphasis added). 
 175. Id. at ¶ 7.2.  
 176. Id. at ¶ 7.2, 9. 
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Two brief examples of state practice are further illustrative of 
the trend toward limitation of the death penalty as it is applied to 
persons with serious mental illness. First, in 2012, the Eastern 
Caribbean Court of Appeals vacated a death sentence against the 
defendant and substituted manslaughter, where experts for the 
prosecution and defense agreed that he “was suffering from an 
abnormality of mind” sufficient to require the lesser, non-capital 
penalty.177 And finally, in Japan, in March 2014, a district court 
released Iwao Hakamada, “who had been on death row since 1968 
and developed mental illness as a result of the decades he had 
spent in isolation.”178 In each of these cases, it appears that the 
illness was sufficiently severe to require mitigation of the death 
penalty. 
VI. Conclusion 
The U.S. Supreme Court needs to more fully and specifically 
define the range of severity of mental illness sufficient to bar the 
carrying out of the death penalty. The “insanity” test of Ford v. 
Wainright is not rigorous enough, and the jumbled conclusions of 
Panetti v. Quarterman give little concrete guidance to the lower 
courts in their determination of where to draw the line regarding 
mental illness among those on death row. If anything, a standard 
like that adopted by the Court in Hall v. Florida, which finds that 
“intellectual disability is a condition, not a number”179 can serve as 
guidance to the courts with regard to mental illness as well. There 
may be a range of conditions that satisfy the courts that the mental 
illness in question mitigates capital punishment. This Article 
suggests that the United Nations, regional human rights bodies, 
and national courts alike have articulated tests, and provides a 
range of options from which to choose. 
                                                                                                     
 177. Shorn Samuel v. The Queen, No. 22 of 2008 (E. Carib. Ct. App., 31 May 
2012). 
 178. Referred to without further citation in the 2014 report of the Secretary 
General to the U.N. General Assembly on the death penalty. UN 
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Blackstone’s Commentaries notes the case of Edward Arnold, 
who was found competent to stand trial and convicted for the 
shooting of a British lord.180 However, Blackstone concludes, 
“being half a madman, [he] was never executed, but confined in 
prison, where he died about thirty years after.”181 In using the term 
“half a madman,” Blackstone meant to distinguish Mr. Arnold from 
the condemned person who is insane. Today, all of humanity has 
no qualms in exempting the insane from the death penalty; such 
has been the case in this country for the thirty years that have 
passed since the decision in Ford v. Wainwright. Yet the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment also should bar the 
sentence of death for those who are “half-mad.” Surely the court 
can fashion a remedy that recognizes that class of offender.  
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